by CalculatedRisk

From Bloomberg: UBS Seeks SF15 Billion Capital Increase, Has First-Quarter Loss

UBS AG ... will seek to raise 15 billion francs ($15.1 billion) in a capital increase after writing down $19 billion in debt securities.

Chairman Marcel Ospel will step down ...

by CalculatedRisk

From Reuters: Centex sells 8,500 U.S. housing lots for a loss

Centex Corp ... sold a portfolio of real estate to a group of investment funds for $455 million, which represents a discount to the properties' $528 million book value.

Dallas-based Centex said it sold 8,500 developed, partly developed and undeveloped lots in 11 states ... Most of the properties are in Nevada and California.

Centex said its proceeds include the $161 million purchase price and an anticipated $294 million tax refund.

The tax refund made the deal work. The buyers paid $161 million, and the actual cost to Centex was higher than $528 million (these properties had already been written down significantly).

by CalculatedRisk

Update: According to the Financial Times, the latest writedowns are expected to be released Tuesday or Wednesday (hat tip sk)

From the Financial Times: UBS set for further writedowns (hat tip crispy&cole)

UBS is poised to reveal further writedowns of up to $18bn and seek a capital increase of about SFr13bn ($13.1bn) ...

Details of the latest writedowns and capital-raising are expected to be released alongside the agenda for the bank’s annual meeting on April 23, which is to be published on Tuesday or on Wednesday.

Just a reminder that the confessional is still open, and the numbers will be huge.

by CalculatedRisk

From Bloomberg: Lehman to Sell $3 Billion of Shares to Institutional Investors (hat tip Tim)

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. ... is selling at least $3 billion of new shares to U.S. institutions to reassure investors it has ample access to capital.

Here are the details from the press release: Lehman Brothers to Offer 3.0 Million Shares of Convertible Preferred Stock (hat tip Dwight)

The non-cumulative dividend rate, conversion rate and other terms are yet to be determined.

TBD?

Update from Reuters: Lehman converts seen having 7-7.5 percent dividend

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc's $3 billion of convertible preferred shares are seen having a dividend of 7 percent to 7.5 percent and a conversion premium of 30 percent to 35 percent ... The deal is expected to be sold by Tuesday before market close ...

by CalculatedRisk

Remember when the Shanghai stock market declined 9% on Feb 27, 2007? That caused shock waves around the world, including a 400 points decline in the DOW index the following day. Well, that was nothing and hardly shows up on the following graph.

Click on graph for larger image.

After falling to 2772 in Feb 2007, the SSE composite index more than doubled! Now the index has fallen back to 3,472 - still well above the close after the one day sell off - but 43% below the peak.

Is this sell off in anticipation of a slowing Chinese economy? Or is this sell off just giving back some of the "irrational exuberance" of the last year?

There are some concerning signs. From the WSJ last week: Tables Turn Quickly on Chinese Developers

Just six months ago, Chinese property developers were on a shopping spree ... borrowing heavily to snap up more, and more expensive, pieces of land.

How quickly things have changed.

Three months into 2008, China's property developers are under siege. Property prices are showing signs of weakness in many of the country's key markets, and capital markets have all but seized up for these -- and other -- offerings. The Chinese government is on a high-profile campaign to clamp down on new bank loans, hoping to curb inflation, rising at its fastest clip in a decade.

Another concern for foreign manufacturers is the new labor laws in China. Over the weekend I spoke with an executive of a U.S. based company that manufactures in China. He told me the new Chinese labor laws, combined with other factors, have increased their manufacturing costs in China by 30%!

Here is an article from Crain's Manchester Business: Made in China

Manchester-based importers who source in China are about to pass on price rises of between 10 and 15 per cent. They say that currency fluctuations, Chinese wage inflation, raw material cost increases and higher freight charges mean that stable or falling prices of manufactured goods are now a thing of the past.
...
“Four of the factories that we do business with in China won't take dollars now,” said [Stuart Illingworth, managing director of Widdop, Bingham & Co, the Oldham-based giftware importer]. ...

Meanwhile, new labour laws came into force in January which have restricted Chinese workers' hours and led to an increase in labour unit costs.

I've always been skeptical of the decoupling argument, so I wouldn't be surprised to finally see a slowdown in China after the Olympics this summer. In the long run, this rebalancing of the world economy, and these new labor laws are healthy - but in the short term this might lead to more inflation in the U.S.

Note: a slowing Chinese economy might have a positive impact on the U.S. economy by leading to lower oil prices, as I speculated in Petroleum Prices and GCC Spending

by Tanta

UPDATE: I don't have time to spend the day deleting racist trolling. I have therefore closed the comments on this thread. We simply are not here to host such things.

Alphonso Jackson resigned as Secretary of HUD today. And not a moment too soon. Think Progress has the list:

A look at Jackson’s tenure of incompetence and corruption:

Loyalty Over Merits: During a speech on April 28, 2006, Jackson recounted a conversation he had with a prospective contractor who had a “heck of a proposal.” This contractor, however, told Jackson, “I don’t like President Bush.” Jackson subsequently refused to award the man the contract. A former HUD assistant secretary confirmed that Jackson told agency employees to “consider presidential supporters when you are considering the selected candidates for discretionary contracts.”

Political Retaliation: In 2006, Jackson allegedly demanded that the Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA) “transfer a $2 million public property” at a “substantial discount” to Kenny Gamble, a developer, former soul-music songwriter, and friend of Jackson’s. When PHA director Carl Greene refused, Jackson and his aides called Philadelphia’s mayor and “followed up with ‘menacing’ threats about the property and other housing programs in at least a dozen letters and phone calls over an 11-month period.”

Contracts For Golfing Buddies: In October 2007, federal investigators looked into whether, after Hurricane Katrina, Jackson lined up an emergency “no-bid contract” at the HUD-controlled Housing Authority of New Orleans for “golfing buddy” and friend William Hairston. According to HUD, the emergency contract paid Hairston $392,000 over a year and a half; Hairston’s partner companies also received “direct contracts” with HUD. One of the companies which received a contract in New Orleans, Columbia Residential, had “significant financial ties to Jackson.” Jackson’s wife also had “ties to two companies that did business with the New Orleans authority.”

Awarding Corrupt Companies: Shirlington Limousine and Transportation Inc. is the firm that defense contractor Brent Wilkes used to “transport congressmen, CIA officials, and perhaps prostitutes to his Washington parties.” The firm’s president had a “lengthy history of illegal activity,” detailed in his 62-page rap-sheet, and his limo company “operates in what looks to be a deliberately murky way.” Despite all this, Jackson’s HUD awarded Shirlington a contract worth $519,823.

Lucrative Salaries For Cronies: Atlanta lawyer Michael Hollis, another Jackson friend, “appears to have been paid approximately $1 million for managing the troubled Virgin Islands Housing Authority,” despite having “no experience in running a public housing agency.” A “top Jackson aide” reportedly made it clear to officials within HUD that “Jackson wanted Hollis” for the job. Hollis received more than four times the salary of his predecessor.

Let's hope someone gets this taken down before the end of the day.

by Tanta

Forbes, via Atrios.

Thornburg, which is based in Santa Fe, N.M., has been beset by "margin calls," or lenders demanding their money back.

The company reached a deal under which its lenders would stop issuing margin calls if Thornburg raised $948 million.

A bond sale arranged to raise money at a 12 percent interest rate failed, and now the company is trying to sell $1.35 billion in bonds at an 18 percent interest rate.

by CalculatedRisk

Paul Krugman explains the Paulson plan in the NY Times: The Dilbert Strategy

Anyone who has worked in a large organization — or, for that matter, reads the comic strip “Dilbert” — is familiar with the “org chart” strategy. To hide their lack of any actual ideas about what to do, managers sometimes make a big show of rearranging the boxes ...

You now understand the principle behind the Bush administration’s new proposal for financial reform, which will be formally announced today: it’s all about creating the appearance of responding to the current crisis, without actually doing anything substantive.

One of the key points is this plan was mostly in place to further deregulate the financial industry:

... the new plan was originally conceived of as “promoting a competitive financial services sector leading the world and supporting continued economic innovation.” That’s banker-speak for getting rid of regulations that annoy big financial operators.

Now, using the credit crisis as cover, the plan is being sold as "a fix" for the current problems.

I’ve been disappointed to see some news outlets report as fact the administration’s cover story — the claim that lack of coordination among regulatory agencies was an important factor in our current problems.

The truth is that that’s not at all what happened. The various regulators actually did quite well at acting in a coordinated fashion. Unfortunately, they coordinated in the wrong direction.

For example, there was a 2003 photo-op in which officials from multiple agencies used pruning shears and chainsaws to chop up stacks of banking regulations. The occasion symbolized the shared determination of Bush appointees to suspend adult supervision just as the financial industry was starting to run wild.

by CalculatedRisk

From Bloomberg: New York City Real Estate Market Slows as Wall Street Cuts Jobs

New York City's residential real estate market is showing the first signs of fallout as U.S. banks and securities firms cut the most jobs in seven years.

Manhattan apartment sales fell in January and February from a year earlier and new properties came to the market at the fastest pace since at least 2000 ... Transactions slid 6.4 percent to 3,250, while the number of condominiums, co- operatives and townhouses for sale at the end of last month climbed to 6,225, 15 percent more than at the start of the year.

With sales falling, and inventory rising, price declines will follow.

by CalculatedRisk

John Mauldin writes: Where is the Bottom in Housing? (hat tips: many!)

Mauldin provides a good overview of the housing market. His analysis is based on information from John Burns Real Estate Consulting and T2 Partners. Both Burns and T2 have made their presentations public.

There is all kinds of charts and information available, but I'll comment on a couple of points. Mauldin writes:

Bottom Line? There is no Bottom in Sight

[Burns] most likely timeline is that resale stability will come back by 2011, and it will be even earlier for the homebuilders. He is projecting 6,000,000 home sales (new and existing) in 2008, but falling to only 4,000,000 in 2009. Low sales volume and high foreclosures will delay inventory reduction, which is required for there to be a stable market.

This means that home ownership will fall to 66% of the population in 2009 from the recent high of 69%. He thinks that may overcorrect to 65% in 2010. When I asked him why the overcorrection, he said it has to do with psychology. Housing will go from the greatest investment in 2006 to a bad one by 2009. The market typically overcorrects at the end of every cycle. It will take rising prices to lure the marginal homebuyer back into the market.

We discussed the recent rise in the price of the homebuilder stocks, which he attributes to short covering. Many of the homebuilders, public and private, are selling land at 16% of book value, or are trying to. He suggests that many of the privately owned homebuilders are in the worst shape.

Bottom line? We are nowhere near the bottom in the home markets.

First, on sales, I think Burns is too optimistic for 2008 and too pessimistic for 2009. Right now we are on pace for just under 5 million existing home sales in 2008, and 600 thousand new home sales (and sales will probably fall further). A forecast for 6 million total sales in 2008 is probably too high.

Similarly a forecast of 4 million total sales in 2009 is probably too pessimistic. The reason Burns is probably too pessimistic on total sales in 2009 is because prices will likely decline further than Burns is forecasting (helping sales). Burns is only forecasting a 16% nationwide price decline from peak to trough. Based on the Case-Shiller National index, house prices are already off 10.1% as of the end of 2007 - with much more declines likely in 2008.

Also according to Burns, there are "3.5 million excess homes that need to be filled by qualified buyers". This is really a confusing metric. Burns arrives at this total by adding excess vacant units to his estimate of future vacant homes due to the declining homeownership rate.

But this approach really confuses a few numbers and concepts. Burns estimate of 1.55 million "vacant homes" is about right, but this includes about 560 thousand excess vacant rental units! (see Inventory, Inventory, Inventory) So a decline in the homeownership rate cannot be added to this number directly - or there would be some double counting.

Also Burns is probably too pessimistic on the decline in the homeownership rate. Recent academic research by Matthew Chambers, Carlos Garriga, and Don E. Schlagenhauf (Sep 2007), "Accounting for Changes in the Homeownership Rate", Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, suggests that there were two main factors for the increase in homeownership rate between 1994 and 2004: 1) mortgage innovation, and 2) demographic factors (a larger percentage of older people own homes, and America is aging).

The authors found that mortgage innovation accounted for between 56 and 70 percent of the recent increase in homeownership rate, and that demographic factors accounted for 16 to 31 percent. Even as we unwind some of the excesses of recent years, not all innovation is going away (securitization and some smaller down payment programs will stay). And the population is still aging, so the homeownership rate will probably only decline to 67%, or maybe "over correct" to 66% - but will probably not decline to 65% or lower. (No one has a crystal ball, so maybe Burns pessimistic view will be proven correct).

And one more point on the declining homeownership rate: this is probably better viewed as a head wind for demand, not as additional supply. Using an excess inventory number of 1.6 million or so is probably more useful when discussing supply.

Even with these minor flaws, this is a good overview.

by Tanta

Taking notice of the endless silliness in the political blogosphere is no part of the mandate of this blog, and we normally try to carry on with our main mission while pretending that we can't hear most of the background noise and cannot feel that terrier gnawing on our ankles. It has never, really, been that we're stupid; it was mostly that we didn't want them to come over here and ruin a perfectly good nerd blog. Political discourse in this country has been so poisoned for so long that we were quite attracted to the possibility of pretending that it wasn't there in case it decided to go away while we weren't looking.

However, I for one did argue, quite early in this mess, that 1) housing policy is political in this country and 2) financial crises are even more so and that therefore 3) whether or not it "should" be that way is immaterial; it is so. The housing bust and the debt bubble pop have been and are going to remain political footballs for the foreseeable future. The least we can do about that is insist that everyone get the elementary concepts right.

Let me therefore do my obligatory least by pointing out that this kind of thing just has to stop:

Apparently, a lot of foreclosed tenants like to trash the house before they leave. I don't get it. It's hardly the bank's fault that you can't make your mortgage payment. I mean, I understand the rage at fate that has pushed you out of your home and left your credit record in shreds--yea, even if you had a hand in that fate yourself. But I don't get pointless destruction.

I can't do anything about anyone who can't quite "get" vandalism, as if it had never existed in the world before middle-class homeowners got in over their heads with mortgage loans. (Really. I was "not getting" the point of cutting off the handset on pay phones and stealing the directory back in the days when we had pay phones and they cost a dime. I was therefore prepared to "not get"--or to "get," as it were--foreclosure "trash-outs," at the point they began to arise (again, in this cycle), since, well, it's a reusable conceptual paradigm thingy.)

But it isn't the not-getting of the "pointless" destruction that makes it less than completely pointless for us to examine this silly little blog post. It's that first sentence with the term "foreclosed tenants" in it.

I "get" vandalism a whole lot more than I "get" a self-described "economics blogger" weilding the English language like that. Which is to say, I suspect I do "get" it. And I don't approve of the latter any more than the former.

There has, for a long time now, been a certain persistent critique of a variety of boom-lending that went something like this: when you take an interest-only no-down-payment loan to buy a house at market price--that is, at anything other than a significant discount to market price--you are in effect, if not in fact, merely "leasing" the house from the bank.

This is a "critique" because, see, "secured lending" only really works when the collateral that secures the loan belongs to the borrower, not the lender. I suppose I could write you a loan that involved my promising to hand over an asset that I already owned to myself--that'll teach me!--in the event that you fail to pay me back as agreed. I'm not sure I could pass a licensing exam with an understanding of the process like that, but you never know.

So the critique came in on the grounds that 1) this is self-defeating for lenders and that 2) it is self-defeating for borrowers. I occasionally run into newbies to the financial world who demand to know why anyone would buy one of these "PO strips" or bonds that do not pay interest. They "get it" once you explain that such bonds are purchased at a "deep discount" to their par or face value. Of course their next question was always why people were using wacky subprime and Alt-A loans to buy houses at "par," and out of the mouths of babes came wisdom.

The point being that "foreclosed tenant" is not simply a curious misunderstanding of law and fact. It is, you know, a way to "get" the "pointless" behavior, if you apply any degree of attention to a contradiction in terms. Possibly some borrowers are coming to the belated recognition that they were, de facto, not much more than tenants who were paying well above "market rent," but the market no longer allows them to "sell" the "lease" to the next sucker, and the law does not allow them to simply forfeit the security deposit and move away. To be a "foreclosed tenant" is to live in the worst of both worlds.

It is possible, you know, that about-to-be-former homeowners understand these things better than self-anointed "economic thinkers" do. They begin to grasp that they had only ever been given a short-term lease on the "American Dream," not a piece of the "ownership society" pie. More than a few of them are very, very, crabby. This, I can "get."

What I also "get" is that here you have a classic example of where the rush to start making a list of people you don't have any "sympathy" for gets you: nowhere, fast. It always disappoints me whenever a thread on one of our foreclosure or predatory lending posts immediately degenerates into a lot of people writing the same comment repeatedly: "I have no sympathy for these people."

It has, actually, been hard for me to "get" why some people think that the first question to be established in any discussion of the real world is whether their own personal sympathies are engaged or not. You'd think I'd be more familiar with the profoundly self-involved than I apparently am, coming out of the banking industry, but there you are. Some entertainment can be wrested out of the situation by responding that I don't have any sympathy for people who don't have any sympathy for other people, but it's limited entertainment because we are often dealing with heads over which such a response tends to fly at a fairly high altitude.

The trouble is I do "get" it. I get why some people need to turn it all into a matter of which contestant is more conventionally attractive, sympathies-wise. The original point of the "joke" about borrowers with these dumb loans just "renting" from the bank was about puncturing the claims of a certain class of economists, who seemed ready to believe that a finance-based "ponzi" economy could go on forever, and that it ought to. If you require to have the joke "foreclosed" in order to defend against its implications for the kool-aid you've been drinking for years about the larger economy, not just real estate, then you might want to willfully misunderstand the point of making jokes. Namely, to see it as making fun of "contemptible" people rather than unmasking the contradictions in economic silliness.

Joking around actually has a long and storied history in the old, old project of arriving at conceptual clarity about important problems, you know. Jokes are not merely "transgressive" of a kind of stuffy demeanor of academics and legislators and courts of law and so on, although they do have an invaluable function in ratcheting down the pompousness to tolerable levels. Jokes are, in fact, often funny because they fail to "resolve" or paper over real contradictions and conflicts: the joke drags it out into the light of day, and leaves it to squirm while we all laugh. We are all subprime now. Is a joke. With, as they say, more than a bit of "truth" in it.

It is of course not always easy to distinguish between a joke and a bog-standard stupidity. We touched on that the other day with the Zippy Tricks. Sometimes the joke actually arises when we find the naive or uninformed or logic-impaired coming up with an inspired phrase like "foreclosed tenants."

Sometimes people feel like they're being "laughed at." That, say, the joke's on them. It has been known for them to get very, very angry. Enough, say, to knock holes in the drywall and rip out the plumbing before following one's belongings to the curb.

Those whose only understanding of humor is to ridicule the victim--not to deflate the hot air filling the designers of this doomed system--will never quite "get" why the butts of the joke become so "pointlessly" destructive. Those humorless souls who do not see an appropriate role for humor in intellectual critique--who really just have to say that this is too serious for such lightmindedness, tut tut--will fail to grasp the overall dynamics of the situation from the other end of it. Between those who have no sympathy for others and those who have only sympathy--syrupy, patronizing, Sunday School-tract simple-minded sympathy--it's a wonder you can get a good joke going some days. Not that I've ever quit trying.

It is within the realm of possibility that some folks engaging in "trash-out refinances" are, well, making the point that the joke's on you, Mr. Bank. You might consider it a kind of performance art of the gallows-humor subgenre. I do think it's a usual expectation that people who write for outfits with the pretensions of The Atlantic are, frequently, expected to try to "get" that. We call these attempts to try to "get" such things intellectual effort. Expenditure of this kind of effort is way harder than, well, just asking yourself if you feel sorry for someone today. Or yukking it up at someone else's "expense."

by CalculatedRisk

Nelson Schwartz and Floyd Norris provide an analysis of the new regulatory plan from the Treasury: In Treasury Plan, a Reluctant Eye Over Wall Street

[T]he proposal would impose the first regulation of hedge funds and private equity funds, that oversight would have a light touch, enabling the government to do little beyond collecting information ...

The plan hands vast new authority to the Federal Reserve, essentially formalizing what has been an improvised process over the last three weeks.

There is much more in the analysis.

by CalculatedRisk

Last night I spoke with a land developer. He just purchased improved land in SoCal (update: Inland Empire) for $0.15 on the dollar from a homebuilder (builder's total cost). The deal closed Friday. The purchase price was less than half the cost of just the improvements (grading, streets, etc)!

The deal has no leverage, and the buyers are hoping to sell in 3 to 5 years to another homebuilder. They can wait much longer if necessary. The other details (like buyer and seller) are confidential.

This is an important step. The homebuilders are finally starting to liquidate surplus land at prices that are attractive to "vulture funds", and this potential inventory is also being removed from the market.

I expect to see many similar deals this year as the homebuilders, and their lenders, struggle to survive.

by CalculatedRisk

From Edmund Andrews at the NY Times: Treasury Dept. Seeks New U.S. Power to Keep Markets Stable (hat tip AllenM)

The Treasury Department will propose on Monday that Congress give the Federal Reserve broad new authority to oversee financial market stability, in effect allowing it to send SWAT teams into any corner of the industry or any institution that might pose a risk to the overall system.

Here is the Treasury’s Summary of Regulatory Proposal. Just some light reading for a friday night.

by CalculatedRisk

From Reuters: S&P cuts FGIC insurance unit's rating to junk status

S&P cut FGIC Corp by six notches to "B," five steps below investment-grade, from "BBB." It downgraded FGIC's insurance arm, Financial Guaranty Insurance Co, by six notches to "BB," two steps below investment grade, from "A."

The outlook is negative

This was expected (Fitch cut FGIC to junk on Wednesday), and FGIC will probably be in run-off (they've already stopped writing new business). Unlike insurers AMBAC and MBIA, FGIC was unable to raise new capital.

by CalculatedRisk

From the WSJ: UBS Cutting Value Of Auction-Rate Securities In Brokerage Accounts

... UBS AG is marking down the value of the securities in its brokerage customers' accounts.

Until now, customers who were unable to sell securities in regularly scheduled auctions were told that the securities retained full value and would receive higher interest rates.

UBS ... will mark them down this afternoon and inform clients via their online statements shortly thereafter ... The markdowns will range from a few percentage points to more than 20% ...

I know investors in ARS, and their banks have been telling them they can't sell - but their principal is safe - it is just a liquidity problem. UBS is telling their customers they can't sell, and their principal is no longer safe.

by CalculatedRisk

The BEA releases Personal Consumption Expenditures monthly (as part of the Personal Income and Outlays report) and quarterly, as part of the GDP report (also released separately quarterly).

You can use the monthly series to exactly calculate the quarterly change in PCE. The quarterly change is not calculated as the change from the last month of one quarter to the last month of the next (several people have asked me about this). Instead, you have to average all three months of a quarter, and then take the change from the average of the three months of the preceding quarter.

So, for Q1, you would average PCE for January, February, and March, then divide by the average for October, November and December. Of course you need to take this to the fourth power (for the annual rate) and subtract one.

The March data isn't released until after the advance Q1 GDP report. But we can use the change from October to January, and the change from November to February (the Two Month Estimate) to approximate PCE growth for Q1.

Click on graph for larger image.

This graph shows the two month estimate versus the actual change in real PCE. The correlation is high (0.92).

The two month estimate suggests real PCE growth in Q2 will be under 1% - but still positive.

In general the two month estimate is pretty accurate. Sometimes the growth rate for the third month of a quarter is substantially stronger or weaker than the first two months. As an example, in Q3 2005, PCE growth was strong for the first two months, but slumped in September because of hurricane Katrina. So the two month estimate was too high.

And the following quarter (Q4 2005), the two month estimate was too low. The first two months of Q4 were negatively impacted by the hurricanes, but real PCE growth was strong in December.

Looking at the data, real PCE has been essentially flat for four straight months. Based on various economic reports, I'd expect March to be even weaker. This suggests that real PCE in Q1 will still be positive, but somewhat below the two month estimate of 1%.

In Q4, real PCE increased 2.3%, but real GDP only increased 0.6%. With real PCE below 1% in Q1, I'd expect a negative real GDP report for Q1. This is very similar to how the last consumer led recession started in 1990.

by CalculatedRisk

Press Release: KB Home Reports First Quarter 2008 Financial Results

“Our industry continues to confront a growing oversupply of new and resale homes, tight mortgage lending conditions and a highly competitive pricing environment. These conditions drove down sale prices and further compressed margins in the first quarter of 2008, prompting us to recognize additional impairment charges and abandon certain land option contracts that no longer made financial sense. Until prices stabilize and consumer confidence returns, we believe inventory levels will remain significantly out of balance with demand. We do not anticipate meaningful improvement in these conditions in the near term, as it is likely to take some time for the market to absorb the current excess housing supply and for consumer confidence to improve.”
Jeffrey Mezger, president and chief executive officer, KB Home
emphasis added

The little bit of good news was KB Home's cancellation rate improved slightly (similar to other builders):

The Company’s cancellation rate improved to 53% in the first quarter of 2008 compared to 58% in the fourth quarter of 2007. The Company’s cancellation rate was 34% in the first quarter of 2007.

Still, it's hard to be too excited about a 53% cancellation rate!

by CalculatedRisk

From Bloomberg: Fremont Ordered by FDIC to Find Buyer; Curbs Imposed

Fremont General Corp., the former subprime lender that raised doubt about its survival earlier this month, was ordered by federal regulators to raise new funds or find a buyer within 60 days.

It was just a little over a year ago that I posted a memo about lending changes at Fremont. Looking back now, that memo seems somewhat subdued, but it was very significant at the time - that memo marked the beginning of the subprime implosion and the start of tighter lending standards.

Based on the new FDIC order that memo probably also marked the beginning of the end of Fremont.

by Tanta

Which, as Dave Barry always says, would be a great name for a band.

CR posted this shocker yesterday, a memo with a Chase logo attached (which doesn't mean much in these copy & paste days), sent via e-mail to mortgage brokers in what appears to be a "package" of "training documents," that provides tips on how to "cheat" and "trick" Zippy, Chase's AUS (automated underwriting system), into approving loans it would not normally approve. (Or, possibly, allowing loans to be documented or priced in a way they would not have been had the loan been submitted properly. It's hard to say exactly.)

I am not especially interested in the debate over whether it was "official Chase policy" (undoubtedly it was not) or whether it was a "joke" started by some wag at Chase ("this is how we oughta be training the brokers, ha ha!"). My own hunch is that it did start out as a joke, but there was at least one Account Executive at Chase who either didn't "get" the joke--which is scary--or who didn't have the sense to realize that certain forms of satire shouldn't leave the building.

But that's the thing: it works for me as a "joke," of the black humor deadpan sort, because, well, it isn't that far off "official policy." "Official policy" is simply couched in ponderous language, hedged about with earnest exhortations not to "misuse" the system that everyone ignores, and mostly "functional" in the sense that it covers certain raw acres of corporate butt, not in the sense that it really communicates clearly to a worker-bee what you're actually supposed to do when certain things--cough, cough--cross your desk.

I say this with complete confidence even though I haven't read Chase policy documents for years, and I have never read internal use only Chase policy documents. I have read hundreds of documents produced by dozens of institutional lenders, wholesalers, and aggregators describing credit policy and acceptable origination practices. I have written quite a few of them, to tell the truth. For that reason I have been in plenty of arguments over the years about those documents, since I have this thing about using language people can actually understand, explaining things clearly, and making policy documents actually useful to everyday operations rather than merely having them around in a file cabinet in case the regulators show up, and entirely ignored by everyone in-house unless and until that day arrives. So I am not speaking with actual detailed knowledge of Chase policy or the likely tone or content of Chase policy documents in particular. I am generalizing based on years and years of having to wade through that crap because no one else will.

What I really got interested in was not where, exactly, this document came from, but why, precisely, it says what it says. I mean, you can see this as a Chase Account Executive (or whoever authored it) simply baldly encouraging fraudulent misrepresentation, and that of course is what it is. But you also have to see that it does appear to require some misrepresentation to get past Zippy in some respects. That much is to Chase's credit.

Also, the way these things tend to work is that the "cheats and tricks" that people come up with--and no, this isn't the only one out there by a long shot, it's just the only one I know of so far that got to a reporter--tend to focus on routine problems. Nobody writes "cheat sheets" to deal with obscure complex things that only arise on one out of 200 loan applications. People write "cheat sheets" to deal with the problems you are most likely to have. And yes, I am using this term "cheat sheet" in its commonplace sense of a "dumbed down" policy or procedure, a set of "short cuts." The term has always been ambiguous: is a "cheat sheet" directions for breaking the rules, or just directions for following them faster and more easily? "Efficiency" and "user friendliness" have always been in danger of converging on the unethical. This is not a new problem. Perhaps our apparently willful lack of attention to this problem over the last several years is what was, in fact, different this time.

Besides the "most common problems," I have often found "cheat sheets" appearing in contexts where it's not so much that the issue at hand is "common," it's that this particular lender has a "thing" about that particular issue. If you ask a bunch of industry participants who are willing to tell you the truth, I suspect you'll find a high degree of consensus on what the "preoccupations" or "hot buttons" for any given wholesaler are. "Everybody knows," the story will go, that X is touchy about gift funds and Y is the hardest to deal with on short-form appraisals and Z isn't the place to go if you want a high-rise condo loan approved. And so on.

That kind of "eccentricity" is less common than it used to be, given nearly universal securitization of loans (which tends to "homogenize" the industry and make lenders willing to write loans they wouldn't touch for their portfolio) and competitive pressures that spawn "races to the bottom" all over the place. In the early years of the boom (until 2005 or so) I used to actually keep spreadsheets in which I tracked policy of ten major correspondent/wholesalers on a couple of dozen selected issues. I did not necessarily select the "common ones"; I was precisely interested in the more offbeat. Like condos with less than four total units in the project, or the rarer forms of temporary buydowns, or non-arm's-length transactions, or foreign national borrowers. ("Foreign national" in this context does not mean undocumented immigrant. It means someone who is not only not a U.S. citizen, but also not even a U.S. resident.) In other words, "niche" stuff that was once simply not allowed at all in the "prime" world, but which increasingly crept into "expanded criteria" programs--the precursor of what you all know as "Alt-A"--and then even into so-called "prime jumbo" or "prime non-agency."

What my little spreadsheet showed was that, over time, we went from an environment in which "go to Lender X if you have a small condo project" was the way it worked, to "just about everyone does small condo projects these days, so why shouldn't we?" It also showed that certain things were "migrating" from "expanded criteria" programs into "mainstream" programs. The race was on. Back in 2005 I was arguing strenuously that it was a race to the bottom, but that was of course a minority view.

Way too many people were convinced that we had the technology that would allow us to "race to the top." The idea was that in the Days of the Dinosaurs, doing 2-flats turned into condos or non-arm's-length deals or what have you was really very risky, but not any more, because now we have all these computer models that can much more finely-tune our risk assessments. Plus there was always the supplementary argument that hey! if someone like Chase is willing to do it, that must mean it's "respectable." That last argument wasn't always stated in such an unvarnished fashion, but that was the drift.

So this brings us back to the Zippy tricks, and the specific content of the infamous memo. If you read it from a certain angle--just for the sake of analytical clarity, not in aid of "defending" what is obviously indefensible--you can see it as some evidence that Chase's system, Zippy, has been correctly programmed to weed out a couple of serious problems:

1. Unstable income. The "trick" of putting all income in "base," instead of breaking it out (as the application form is designed to get you to do) into base salary, bonus, commissions, etc., is partly about getting the AUS to "let you by" with only a paystub to verify current income, if that. This is because it has been recognized since about the end of the last Ice Age that base salaries tend to be fairly stable, but bonuses and commissions tend to be rather volatile. This "other" income is, traditionally, used to qualify borrowers only when they can verify a history of having received it regularly, typically for a minimum of two years, and prospects for continuing to receive it, typically for at least the next three years. It is difficult to verify prospects; in most cases lenders digged so deeply into the past history of the income because that was the best clue to its likely continuation. The theory, for instance, was that an employer who regularly paid bonuses for the last several years was more likely to continue to pay them in the future than an employer who only just paid its first bonus a few weeks ago. Of course, stability of income projecting into the future was important because, well, we expected loans to repay out of income, not refinance money or sale of the home.

You can, if you like, theorize that Zippy has some "rules" built into it that involve a different set of parameters or a higher degree of scrutiny or possibly even a different "rate sheet" when the loan has substantial qualifying income other than base salary. It should. So the instructions to defeat that purpose by lumping everything into "base" is not just saving some idiot some keystrokes. And it's not a trivial thing involving some fussbudget who wants the forms filled out properly for no real reason. There's a real reason here.

2. Gift funds. We have been banging on for years now about borrowers having no "skin in the game." Lenders need to know--have always required to know--what the source of the down payment money is. It isn't just that loans with gifted down payments default more often, although they do. It's also that a lot of fraudulent "straw borrower" deals require "gift funds" to work out. Zippy was programmed to require this information for very good reasons.

3. "Inching up" income. Well, that one's pretty obvious. It is, however, the point at which I for one conclude that Zippy was probably not programmed correctly.

The fact of the matter is that an AUS should simply ignore DTI or cash reserve calculations when income or assets are or can be unverified. In fact, using DTI or months of reserves in your underwriting decision will inevitably produce worse results on a "stated/stated" loan than ignoring them will. They mislead you. I have known good, experienced, savvy human underwriters to fall into this trap, in spite of themselves: they see those "nice-looking" numbers and can't stop themselves from using them as a "compensating factor" on the loan.

There are people in the industry who think that "NINAs" are "worse than" stated income/stated asset loans, but I have never been one of them. What distinguishes them is that in a NINA, you don't even state numbers. You literally leave those boxes on the application blank. The loan is qualified with a credit report and an appraisal.

Now, I'll agree that NINAs are stupid--no problem there. But they're less stupid than "stated" deals. They don't "distract" you with made-up numbers. Actually, they often result in much better analysis of the appraisal and the credit report than you get in a "stated" deal. After all, the appraisal and the credit report are all you got in a NINA: you work 'em over. In the "stated" world people--and apparently some computers--keep getting sidetracked by those unverified numbers.

So I got the impression, for what it's worth, that Zippy is a mixed bag: it seems to have some responsible programming and some stupid programming. As I remarked in the comments to yesterday's post, the fact that it doesn't flash red lights and immediately refer the loan to the fraud-detection squad when it notices that a file keeps getting "resubmitted" with "refreshed" income and asset numbers is a huge problem. If this AUS really does allow multiple resubmissions with increasing stated income each time without setting off the red fraud flags, this is a very big deal for Chase. I'm here to suggest that Chase's regulators need to look into that. As I said, given the chance that the memo is a "joke," it's possible that the thing handles re-runs better than it sounds like it does. But Chase should have to answer this question now that the memo is on the table.

The final question for me, then, is what if anything is likely to be "unique" to Chase here. My answer is "not much." This just isn't in the same class as small condo projects or foreign nationals. We're talking Underwriting 101 stuff that brokers can, apparently, defeat by just putting a number in the wrong data-field or putting a "no" in the gift funds field or getting the system to keep "recalculating" DTI or cash reserves until you have forced it to reveal to you where its cutoffs are.

We all know why people do those things. What somebody needs to explain to me is how, after all this time, it's still so easy to do it. Where are the internal plausibility checks? Where is the "behavioral" logic that notices not just the content of the datafile but the manner in which it was submitted? Where's the basic randomly-selected pre-closing QC that snatches files out of the AUS queue and matches up the data submitted to the AUS with a quick phone call to the borrower?

Where, in other words, is the "high" tech? We've had AUS since the green-screen mainframer days of the 80s, kids. Thirty years down the road and these things are as easy to fool as Barbie's My First Laptop? After all the money these lenders have spent over the years on IT? There's something else that doesn't add up here besides a borrower's paystubs.

Technology aside, where, we also have to ask, are the "real" writers of policy and procedural and training documents? My own sense is that you find "cheat sheets" in companies that don't provide "real sheets" that are usable or comprehensible or updated or easily available on the website. We are, you know, in the "cut & paste" days. It's just no longer difficult to provide your people--or your broker clients--with the "real thing." Anyone who used to prepare policy with a Selectric and an old slow photocopier has a right, I think, to ask just what we're getting out of the "information" part of the "IT revolution." We just shouldn't have to have "cheat sheets" any longer; the "search" button takes care of the difficulties of looking things up. It matters, and it matters because asking people to look at the "real" policy instead of some dumbed-down "cheat sheet" written up by an Account Executive is not too much to ask. You think you will ever control for unethical behavior when you don't even demand moderate amounts of effort?

The whole industry has some explaining to do.

by CalculatedRisk

From Bloomberg: Fannie, Freddie May Raise $20 Billion, Regulator Says

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the U.S. government-chartered mortgage companies, may raise as much as $20 billion in capital as part of an agreement that allows them to buy more debt securities, their regulator said.
...
``There's no specific number,'' [James Lockhart, director of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight] said. ``There was a range of numbers. The best way is to say it's significant.'' The amount raised will be ``much more'' than the $5.9 billion of capital released by reducing the cushion, Lockhart said.
...
``The two enterprises have effectively become the mortgage market at this point,'' Lockhart said. ``Effectively they have become the lender of first, last and every resort.''

by CalculatedRisk

Federal Reserve Governor Frederic S. Mishkin spoke tonight: Comfort Zones, Shmumfort Zones. Mishkin tries to answer the question of why 1% to 2% inflation it better than zero inflation:

Can Inflation Be Too Low?
While the benefits of low inflation are now widely recognized, somewhat less attention has been given to the pitfalls of maintaining inflation rates very close to zero, so I will now discuss this issue in somewhat greater detail. Specifically, if the average inflation rate is too low, then the economy faces a greater risk that a given adverse shock could distort labor markets, induce debt deflation, or cause monetary policy to become constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. These risks imply that undershooting a zero inflation objective is potentially more costly than overshooting that objective by the same amount, and that setting the inflation objective at a rate a bit above zero provides some insurance against these risks.

Downward nominal wage rigidities. Inflation at rates close to zero might create nonnegligible costs to the economy because firms may be relatively reluctant to cut nominal wages. Sticky nominal wages can prevent labor markets from reaching the optimal equilibrium. However, empirical evidence from Switzerland and Japan indicates that in an environment of deflation or very low inflation, downward nominal wage rigidities become less prevalent.

Debt deflation. Keeping the average inflation rate close to zero increases the likelihood that the economy will experience occasional episodes of deflation. Deflation can be particularly dangerous for an advanced economy, in which debt contracts often have long maturities. As described by Irving Fisher (1933), an episode of deflation can lead to "debt deflation," that is, a substantial rise in the real indebtedness of households and firms, because the nominal values of debt obligations are largely predetermined whereas the nominal values of household income and business revenue are falling together with the general price level. Indeed, the deterioration of the balance sheets of households and firms can result in financial turmoil that contributes to further deflation and greater macroeconomic instability.

The zero lower bound. With a very low average inflation rate, monetary policy is also more likely to encounter circumstances in which short-term interest rates are constrained by the so-called zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Specifically, investors will never choose to lend money at a negative nominal interest rate because they always have the option of simply holding cash at a zero interest rate; thus, nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero.

by CalculatedRisk

From Kevin Hall at McClatchy Newspapers: Home prices may not rebound till 2010 (hat tip John)

U.S. home prices are unlikely to recover until at least 2010, [Frank Nothaft, the chief economist for government-sponsored mortgage buyer Freddie Mac] said Thursday, adding that home building this year is likely to post its worst year in five decades.

Check out Nothaft's presentation: The Mortgage and Housing Market Outlook - all kinds of interesting data and charts.

by CalculatedRisk

After the Census Bureau releases the preliminary New Home sales estimate, they revise the estimate three times (over the next three months) as more data becomes available.

Historically the revisions can be in either direction - higher or lower - but beginning in 2005 I noticed that most of the revisions were down. All of the revisions (between preliminary and final) were down in 2006 and for most of 2007. It appeared that the Census Bureau had a systemic error in estimating preliminary sales during periods of rapidly declining sales.

Click on graph for larger image.

This graph shows the percent difference between the final revision and the preliminary release since the beginning of 2003.

Although we don't have the final revisions for December '07 and January '08, I've plotted the intermediate revisions - and the revisions are up slightly.

This suggests - tentatively - that the period of rapid declines in New Home sales may be over. This doesn't mean sales can't fall further - they might, or that sales will recover to 2005 levels any time soon - they won't. This is just a hint of a change in trend (I was using the same hint in '05 arguing the sales bubble might be over).

Another indication that we might be nearing a bottom in sales is that builder cancellation rates appear to be falling. As an example, Lennar reported today that their cancellation rate had declined to 26% in fiscal Q1 2008, from 33% in fiscal Q4 2007.

Earlier today, Stuart Miller, President and Chief Executive Officer of Lennar Corporation, said,

"Market conditions have remained challenged and continued to deteriorate throughout our first quarter of 2008. The housing industry continues to be impacted by an unfavorable supply and demand relationship, which restricts the volume of new home sales and, concurrently, depresses home prices in most markets across the country."

This "unfavorable supply and demand relationship" will probably continue for some time, but this may mean sales stay near this level rather than fall further. Also note, a spike down due to the recession is possible, but then I'd expect a fairly quick recovery back to the 600K level.

by CalculatedRisk

Excerpts from Atlanta Fed President Dennis P. Lockhart: Current Economic Situation, Outlook, and Recent Actions

... the economy is in a slowdown that resembles past periods that were the leading edge of a recession.
...
Looking ahead, my forecast has been affected both by an economic slowdown that has been sharper than I had expected and the recurring spells of financial market turmoil. A few months ago our forecast at the Atlanta Fed saw growth slow in the first half of 2008, then pick up in the second half of the year. But it now appears to me that the contraction in housing and the dampening effects of financial turmoil on household and business spending could persist through the remainder of this year. The recovery in growth I had expected in the second half of this year may be delayed.
emphasis added

It appears Lockhart is still too optimistic on house prices:

I expect it will take much of the rest of the year for house prices to bottom out and financial markets to restore the necessary preconditions of stability—that is, confidence in asset values and confidence in transaction counterparties.

by CalculatedRisk

The Oregonian is reporting this morning on a JPMorgan Chase memo titled "Zippy Cheats & Tricks". The Oregonian obtained a copy of the memo, and the memo apparently offers tips on how to get loans through Chase's in-house automated loan underwriting system:

The document recommends three "handy steps" to loan approval:

Do not break out a borrower's compensation by income, commissions, bonus and tips, as is typically done in a loan application. Instead, lump all compensation as the applicant's base income.

If your borrower is getting some or all of a down payment from someone else, don't disclose anything about it. "Remove any mention of gift funds," the document states, even though most mortgage applications specifically require borrowers to disclose such gifts.

If all else fails, the document states, simply inflate the applicant's income. "Inch it up $500 to see if you can get the findings you want," the document says. "Do the same for assets."
...
"This is not how we do things," [Chase spokesman Tom Kelly] said. "We continue to investigate" the memo, Kelly said. "That kind of document would neither be condoned or tolerated."

Added: the article very clearly states this was for stated income loans - and that Chase no longer offers these loans. In no way do I think this was Chase's policy - instead this shows how some people (possibly Chase insiders) were helping borrowers (or mortgage brokers) commit mortgage fraud.

by CalculatedRisk

From homebuilder Lennar's press release:

Stuart Miller, President and Chief Executive Officer of Lennar Corporation, said, "Market conditions have remained challenged and continued to deteriorate throughout our first quarter of 2008. The housing industry continues to be impacted by an unfavorable supply and demand relationship, which restricts the volume of new home sales and, concurrently, depresses home prices in most markets across the country."

"Home inventories have been expanding due to the high number of foreclosures, negotiated 'short sales,' and stretched homeowners looking to sell homes they can no longer afford. While sales are occurring and clearing prices are being reached, the pace of overall housing inventory growth is exceeding absorption at the current time."

"Concurrently, lower consumer confidence has quieted demand among prospective homebuyers and deterred them from a buying decision, while contraction in the lending markets has reduced the availability of credit for those prospective homebuyers that do wish to buy a home."
emphasis added